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THE CONFLICT IN DECISIONS RESPECTING THE 
REQUIREMENT OF REASONABLE AND PROBABLE 
GROUNDS BEFORE USE OF CERTIFICATE EVIDENCE IN 
BREATHALYZER OFFENCES
By William H. W attst
Prosecutions under the breathalyzer legislation have given rise 
to two different interpretations of the precise effect of section 
235(1) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, C. C-34, which reads 
as follows:
235.(1) Where a peace officer on reasonable and probable 
grounds believes that a person is committing, or at any time within 
the preceding two hours has committed, an offence under section
234, he may, by demand made to that person forthwith or as soon 
as practicable, require him to provide then or as soon thereafter as 
is practicable a sample of his breath suitable to enable an analysis 
to be made in order to determine the proportion, if any, of alcohol 
in his blood, and to accompany the peace officer for the purpose 
of enabling such a sample to be taken.
In the case where a person has taken the breathalyzer test 
subsequent to a demand made pursuant to S.235(l) and a reading 
of .08 or more has been found, the Courts have split on the ques­
tion whether the reasonable and probable grounds mentioned in 
S.235(l) are a condition precedent to a legal demand to take the 
test.
In R. v. Wirsta,1 Kerans, D.C.J. held at pp. 540-1 that a de­
mand can only be made if reasonable and probable grounds exist, 
and if the demand is not made on this basis the certificate of the 
technician is not admissible:
Section 223 clearly provides that a peace officer is only entitled 
to make a demand for a breathalyzer test when he believes that a 
person is committing or has committed an offence under S.222 . . . 
and that there are reasonable and probable grounds for such belief.
Any other demand is not a demand made by the authority of 
S.223(l). To put any interpretation other than this on the words of 
S.224A(l)(f) would be to render them meaningless and I think 1 
properly state the law on interpretation of statutes that when 
Parliament puts words in a statute they presumably put them there 
for some purpose.
Therefore, I am of the view that a certificate is not receivable 
under S .224A (l)(f) until it is first demonstrated to me that a de­
mand was made for a test by a peace officer believing an offence 
had been committed, and having reasonable and probable grounds 
for that belief.
t Third Year Law Student, The University of New Brunswick
1 [1971] 1 C.C.C. (2nd) 538, Alta. D.C.
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Section 2 24A (l)(f) to which the learned Justice refers to 
above is now S.237 (1) (0  of the Criminal Code and reads as 
follows:
237 (1) (f) where a sample of the breath of the accused has been 
taken pursuant to a demand taken under subsection (1) of section 
235, a certificate of a qualified technician stating:
(i) that a chemical analysis of the sample has been made by 
means of an approved instrument operated by him in which a 
substance or solution suitable for use in that approved instrument 
and identified in the certificate was used,
(ii) the result of the chemical analysis so made, and
(iii) if the sample was taken by him,
(A) That at the time the sample was taken he offered to provide 
to the accused a specimen of the breath of the accused in an 
approved container for his own use, and, at request of the accused 
made at that time, such a specimen was thereupon provided to him,
(B) the time when and place where the sample and any specimen 
described in clause (A) was taken, and
(C) that the sample was received from the accused directly into an 
approved container or into an approved instrument operated by 
him,
is evidence of the statements contained in the certificate without 
proof of the signature or the official character of the person 
appearing to have signed the certificate.
Kerans, D.C.J. has obviously directed himself to the following 
part of section 237(1) (f) in coming to his decision:
237 (1) (f) where a sample of the breath of the accused has been 
taken pursuant to a demand taken under subsection (1) of section
235, a certificate of a qualified technician . . .  is evidence . . . .
What the judgement says is that to be valid certificate evi­
dence it must be obtained “pursuant to a demand taken under 
subsection (1) of section 235”, and that there can be no valid 
demand under S.235(1) unless there are reasonable and probable 
grounds.
Kerans, C.J. also held that the absence of reasonable and 
probable grounds, while it would render certificate evidence inad­
missible due to the demand not being made under authority of 
statute, would not have the same effect on evidence offered viva 
voce:
Were this the ordinary case of evidence perhaps illegally or un­
fairly obtained, but nevertheless obtained, the Supreme Court of 
Canada has very recently, in The Queen v. W ray, [1970] 4 C.C.C.
1, 11 D.L.R. (3rd) 673, 11 C.R.N.S. 235, affirmed that, however 
unfairly obtained, evidence obtained may be used against the 
accused, and that the trial Court has no right on these grounds to 
refuse admission of evidence of substantial probative value. If the 
Crown here were attempting to introduce the results of this breath­
alyzer test viva voce, and not by any procedural short cut, its 
position would be very strong.2
2 Ib id  at p. 540.
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In Reference Re Sections 222, 224 and 224 A of the Criminal 
Code,3 Limerick, J.A. for the Court at pp. 248-49 also includes 
reasonable and probable grounds as one of the conditions preced­
ent for proving a charge under S.234 of the Criminal Code:
At this point, it may be convenient to state in general terms the 
Court’s opinion of what should be proved to establish a case under 
S.224 of the Criminal Code, i.e., a charge that the accused drove 
or had the care or control of a motor vehicle, having consumed 
alcohol in such a quantity that the proportion thereof in his blood 
exceeds 80 mg. of alcohol in 100 ml. of blood. These include: 1. A 
peace officer must show that on reasonable grounds he believed 
the accused was committing, or at any time within the preceding 
two hours had committed, an offence under S.222 and for that 
reason he made a demand of the accused pursuant to S .2230) to 
provide a sample of his breath, and to accompany the peace officer 
for the purpose of enabling the sample to be taken.
The learned Justice made two key statements in what is essen­
tially a reproduction of S. 235(1), formerly S.223(l). He held that 
a peace officer “must” show reasonable grounds in order that a 
charge under S.234— formerly S.222—be proved. The word 
“must” does not occur in S.235(l). The judge also used the phrase 
“for that reason” to make it clear that the only basis on which a 
peace officer can make a demand pursuant to S. 235(1) is the 
existence of reasonable and probable grounds for belief that an 
offence has been or is being committed. If the peace officer does 
not connect the demand with reasonable and probable grounds the 
charge cannot be proven, for this link “must” be proved.
The B.C. Supreme Court has also held that reasonable and 
probable grounds are a condition precedent to the admissibility of 
certificate evidence. In the case of R. v. Manchester,4 the N.B. 
Reference* case and R.v. Wirsta0 were followed, and the Court 
held the following, per Munroc, J. at p. 329:
Clearly then, such certificate is not evidence unless the require­
ments of S.223 . . . are met. That section authorizes a peace officer 
to demand a sample of breath from a person where he ‘on reason­
able and probable grounds believes that a person is committing, or 
at any time within the preceding two hours has committed, an of­
fence under Section 222’ (that is, driving or having the care or 
control of a motor vehicle while his ability to drive is impaired by 
alcohol or a drug) but not otherwse. Failure at trial to show such 
belief on the part of the peace officer renders the certificate inad­
missible and means that there was no evidence before the Court 
to disclose the result of the chemical analysis.
It is submitted that the three cases cited requiring reasonable 
and probable grounds as a condition precedent to a valid demand 
to take the breathalyzer test give the correct interpretation of 
S.235(l). If this were not so, the mention of reasonable and 
probable grounds in S.235(1) would be totally superfluous.
3 (1971) 3 C.C.C. (2nd) 243 (N.B.C.A.).
* [1971] 4 C.C.C. (2nd) 327.
0 Supra, footnote 3.
6 Supra, footnote 1.
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Despite what seems to be the obvious intent of S.235(l), 
however, there is a line of authority to the effect that reasonable 
and probable grounds are not a condition precedent to a valid 
demand to take the test and, therefore, not a requirement for the 
admissibility of certificate evidence obtained subsequent to a de­
mand made by a peace officer.
In R. v. Orchard 7, a decision of the Saskatchewan Court of 
Appeal, an appeal against a breathalyzer conviction was dismissed. 
It was held that reasonable and probable grounds were not re­
quired.
In R. v. Showell 8, a decision of the Ontario High Court, 
Haines, J. at p. 255 held that reasonable and probable grounds 
were not a condition precedent to a valid demand under S. 235(1):
The Respondent alleges that it is a condition precedent to the officer’s 
making a demand that he have reasonable and probable cause to be­
lieve that the accused within two hours had been guilty of impaired 
driving. I must disagree. For a demand to be made pursuant to 
S.223(l) it is sufficient merely for the officer to say he is asking 
for a breath sample pursuant thereto. Nothing else is necessary, 
and were the section construed to mean anything else but that, the 
problems in enforcing remedial automobile legislation would be 
virtually insurmountable. Considering the death and destruction 
caused by drinking drivers, no such intention should be imparted to 
parliament in the absence of the clearest language.
The validity of the above judgement is questionable. It advo­
cates the interpretation of the breathalyzer legislation in a way that 
will best facilitate convenience of enforcement. If this approach 
were accepted, it would constitute a rather novel principle of 
statutory interpretation. The desire of the judge in this case to see 
the death and destruction caused by drinking drivers eliminated is 
no doubt laudable, but it is no justification for flying in the face of 
the clear wording of S.235(l) requiring reasonable and probable 
grounds.
At this point, it might be useful to discuss what the Courts 
have defined as reasonable and probable grounds. This conccpt 
was scrutinized in the case of R. v. Murphy. 9 In the course of this 
decision Coffin, J.A. quotes at p. 15 from the judgement of 
O’Hearn, J.M.C.H. in R. v. Cluney: 10
7 [1971] 13 C.R.N.S. 235.
» [1971] 4 C.C.C. (2nd) 252.
o (1972) 3 N.S.R. (2nd) 11 (N.S.C.A.).
10 1971, C.C. 47070. This is Coffin, J.A.’s citation. He gives no page 
number for the excerpt.
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. . . the demanding officer has to have a belief that the recipient 
of the demand is committing, or at any time within the preceding 
two hours has committed an offence under s.222. I discussed what 
the quality of that belief would have to be in R. vs. Percy Herbert 
Jewers, CC 1 46600, 1971, June 21, unrcported, and 1 adhered 
to the opinion that it does not have to be a certainty, or even a 
belief that the defendant is more probably impaired than not, but 
there must be a belief in a substantial probability that the defend­
ant is committing, or has committed within the time limited, a 
specified offense.
In clarifying what constitutes reasonable and probable 
grounds Coffin, J.A. at pp. 15-16 also referred to the judgement 
of Justice O’Hearn in R. v. J ewers: 11
The legislative purpose of Criminal Code s.223(l) is to give peace 
officers a means of subjecting motorists who obviously pose a 
potential threat to the public because of their consumption of 
alcohol or a drug to the test provided for in Criminal Code S.224A.
That legislative purpose would obviously be frustrated if the officer 
had to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the suspect 
was guilty or even if he had to be convinced by a preponderance
According to Justice O’Hearn, therefore, reasonable and 
probable grounds exist when there is a belief “in a substantial prob­
ability” that the suspect is impaired, based on “strong objective 
grounds”. After approving Justice O’Hearn’s view of reasonable 
and probable grounds, Coffin, J.A. went on to hold that there had 
been these grounds in the case before him, and in so doing gave an 
indication of what might constitute some of the “strong objective 
grounds” which could give rise to reasonable and probable grounds 
for belief on the part of a peace officer that an offence had been or 
was being committed:
On arriving at the scene of the accident the Constable noticed that 
Murphy’s eyes were glossy and he noticed the smell of liquor com­
ing from the car. When the appellant walked from his own car to 
that of Detective Spark, Constable Boutilier noticed the unsteadi­
ness in his gait and that ‘He was kind of light on his feet. Just not 
sure. Like he was placing his feet.’ At the Victoria General Hospi­
tal he noticed Mr. Murphy’s eyes were glossy.
In my view these observations, together with the fact that it 
would be clear to Constable Boutilier that Murphy was behind 
the steering wheel of a vehicle which had just bumped into the rear 
end of the taxi, were sufficient to provide Constable Boutilier with 
reasonable and probable grounds for believing that the appellant 
was committing or had committed within the preceding two hours 
an offence under s.222 of the Code, and that he had such reason­
able and probable grounds for such belief at the time he gave the 
appellant the demand. 12
11 1971 C.C. 46600 at pp. 8-9. Again, this is Coffin, J.A.’s citation
of evidence. Viewed in this light, it must surely be sufficient that 
there are strong objective grounds, although not necessarily con­
clusive or preponderating, to think that the suspect’s ability to drive 
a motor vehicle is impaired by alcohol or a drug.
12 Supra footnote 9, at p. 16.
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It is submitted that requiring such objective grounds as are 
typified in R. v. Murphy 13 to establish reasonable and probable 
grounds would hardly render the problems of enforcing the 
breathalyzer legislation ‘insurmountable’ as was suggested in R. v 
Showell 14 Drunken drivers inevitably betray themselves by the 
signs of mental and physical dysfunction which accompany impair­
ment through drink, and the requirement of reasonable and prob­
able grounds merely insures that a peace officer will not make a 
demand to an individual who shows no objective signs of impair­
ment.
So far we have been dealing with the requirement of reasonable 
and probable grounds in the case where a demand to take the test 
has been made, and a test taken. Does, then, the requirement of 
reasonable and probable grounds have any relevance where the test 
has been refused? There are cases which, while denying the rele­
vance of reasonable and probable grounds to the admissibility of 
certificate evidence when the test is taken, nevertheless hold that 
the absence of reasonable and probable grounds constitutes a rea­
sonable excuse for not submitting to the test. This interpretation 
obviously grows out of S.235(2) of the Criminal Code which reads 
as follows:
235 (2) Every one who, without reasonable excuse, fails or refuses 
to comply with a demand made to him by a peace officer under 
subsection (1) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary 
conviction and is liable to a fine of not less than fifty dollars and 
not more than one thousand dollars or to imprisonment for not 
more than six months, or both. 1968-69, c.38, s. 16.
In R. v. Vcrischagin, 15 for example, it was decided that the 
absence of reasonable and probable grounds was material only 
where the test had been refused. Culliton, C.J.S. reasoned at p. 475 
as follows:
The wording of S.223(l) [now S.235(l)] places upon a peace 
officer the onus of determining whether there are reasonable and 
probable grounds, in his belief, that a person within the preced­
ing two hours had committed an offence under s.222 of the 
Criminal Code. If he decides that question in the affirmative, 
then he may make the demand for the breath sample. If that 
sample is obtained, then whether or not the belief of the peace 
officer was well founded is neither open to review by the Court 
nor material to the admissibility of the relevant certificates. Such 
sample of breath has been taken pursuant to a demand under 
S.223(l).
Whether or not the belief of the peace officer was well 
founded would be a material factor when a person is charged 
without reasonable excuse of failing or refusing to comply with 
the demand made to him for a sample of his breath. If the evidence 
failed to establish that there were reasonable and probable grounds 
for the peace officer’s belief, that would constitute a reasonable 
excuse for his failure or refusal to comply with the demand.
13 Supra footnote 9.
14 Supra footnote 8.
™ [1972] 6 C.C.C. (2nd) 473.
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The difficulty with this judgement is that there is nothing in 
S.235(2) (which talks in terms of a “reasonable excuse” for refusing 
or failing to comply with a peace officer’s demand) to connect this 
reasonable excuse with an absence of reasonable and probable 
grounds. Unfortunately, S.235(2) does not say that an absence of 
reasonable and probable grounds constitutes a reasonable excuse 
under S.235(2). If it is admitted, however, that one cannot have a 
valid demand to take the breathalyzer test unless there are reason­
able and probable grounds the problem is solved. One need not 
then argue reasonable excuse under S.235(2). An accused could 
merely say that because there were no reasonable and probable 
grounds, there was no lawful demand, and because there is no 
obligation to submit to an unlawful demand, therefore, there was 
no obligation on him to take the test. He justifies his refusal to take 
the test, in other words, solely under S.235(l) on the basis that 
reasonable and probable grounds are there laid down as a condi­
tion precedent to a valid demand.
It may very well be that the legislature meant the absence of 
reasonable and probable grounds to be a reasonable excuse for not 
taking the test under S.235(2). If this is so, however, the legislation 
should state it clearly.
In R.v. Showell10 it was again held (at p. 256) that an absence 
of reasonable and probable grounds was only relevant where the 
breathalyzer test had been refused:
In summary, the requirement of reasonable and probable grounds 
of S.223(l) is not an ingredient of the demand such that the non­
existence of the grounds results in the demand not being a S.223(1) 
demand. Rather, it is a substantive provision setting out a defence 
for a refusal to give a breath sample. Therefore, even if the de­
mand is made without reasonable and probable grounds it is a 
S.223(l) demand within the meaning of S.224A(1) (c) and, there­
fore certificate evidence of the results is admissible.
It is difficult to follow the logic of this judgement. If a de­
mand, as this judgement says, is valid even in the absence of rea­
sonable and probable grounds, then why should a person be able to 
escape the consequences of refusing to comply with such a legal 
demand simply by invoking an absence of these same grounds. 
If there is a legal demand it would seem that this should settle the 
matter, reaonable and probable grounds or not.
The only way of approaching the problem logically, it is sub­
mitted, is to say that the consequence of an absence of reasonable 
and probable grounds is to render a demand made pursuant to 
S.235(l) invalid. This approach would reject the holding of the 
Showell 17 case insofar as it says that there can be a valid S.235(l) 
demand without reasonable and probable grounds.
10 Supra footnote 8.
17 ¡bid.
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The above suggested approach of invalidating a demand in the 
absence of reasonable and probable grounds would, on the other 
hand, give the same result as the Showell18 case where the test had 
been refused and no reasonable and probable grounds were found. 
It has the advantage, however, of providing a logical basis for the 
result inasmuch as it does not state peremptorily that an absence 
of reasonable and probable grounds is a defence for refusing the 
test. It gives as a logical basis the interpretation of S.235(1) in such 
a way as to require reasonable and probable grounds as a condition 
precedent to a valid demand, and therefore as a condition precedent 
to any obligation on the part of a citizen to submit to a breathalyzer 
test.
In conclusion, it can be said that the inclusion of the phrase 
“ reasonable and probable grounds” in S.235(l) of the Criminal 
Code has given rise to a great deal of confusion in cases resulting 
from prosecutions under the breathalyzer legislation. We are left 
with a chaotic situation where the courts of New Brunswick, Al­
berta, and B.C. have required proof of reasonable and probable 
grounds beiore certificate evidence can be admissible, while courts 
in Ontario and Saskatchewan have decided the opposite. All the 
courts, on the other hand, seem to agree that the defence of rea­
sonable and probable grounds is available where the test has been 
refused, whether the defence arises under S.235(l) or S.235(2). 
However, as pointed out, there could be some clarification in this 
area. Even though all the courts arrive at the same latter result the 
reasoning leading to this result is divergent.
It is submitted that the proper course would be for S.235(l) 
to be amended in such a way as to make it perfectly clear that rea­
sonable and probable grounds are a condition precedent to the 
validity of a demand to take a breathalyzer test. This would give 
rise to two important results. In the case where the test is taken 
and reasonable and probable grounds are not proved, certificate 
evidence would not be admissible. In the case where the test is 
refused and reasonable and probable grounds are not proved, the 
case would be dismissed on the grounds that the accused was under 
no obligation to submit to an invalid demand to take the breath­
alyzer test.
»8 ibid.
